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I. INTRODUcTION
The physician-patient privilege is neither a new phenomenon that has thrust
itself upon the legal community nor an area of the law that is rapidly changing.
Recognition of the privilege began in the early nineteenth century,' and, despite
occasional legislative tinkering, it remains relatively unaltered.
Numerous articles have been written about the privilege as it exists both
nationwide 2 and in Ohio.3 However, the Ohio Tort Reform Act of 1987, 4 hailed as
one of the most dramatic tort law revisions ever, alters the scope and applicability of
Ohio's physician-patient privilege. Since the revisions included in the Tort Reform
Act only recently became effective, 5 a contemporary analysis of Ohio's physician-
patient privilege is indeed timely and essential.
This Note will discuss the history of the physician-patient privilege up to and
including changes brought about by the Tort Reform Act of 1987. A limited
discussion will address portions of the privilege unaltered by the Tort Reform Act,
with detailed analysis devoted to those provisions of the privilege most affected by
the Act. Finally, this Note will discuss areas of the privilege that need further
refinement.
II. HISTORY OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
A. General History
The physician-patient privilege is a creature unknown to common law. As early
as 1776 in Dutchess of Kingston's Trial,6 English courts determined that if a
physician voluntarily revealed information obtained through the physician-patient
relationship to the general public, the physician would be guilty of a breach of honor
and a great indiscretion. The court, however, did not legally recognize a physician-
patient privilege. Thus, under the common law, if a physician revealed information
1. See infra note 2 and accompanying text.
2. See generally Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawsyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597 (1980);
Note, Legal Protection of the Confidential Nature of the Physician-Patient Relationship, 52 COLutM. L REV. 383 (1952);
Note, Medical Practice and the Right to Privacy, 43 MINN. L. REv. 943 (1959); Note, The Scope of the Physician-Patient
Privilege in Criminal Actions: A New Balancing Test, 64 NEB. L. REv. 772 (1985); Note, The Physician-Patient Privilege,
56 Nw. U.L. REV. 263 (1961); and Case Comment, Mathis v. Hilderbrand, 416 P.2d8 (Alaska 1966), 36 U. CtN. L. REV.
152 (1967).
3. DeWitt, Privileged Communications Between Physician and Patient, 10 W. RES. L. REV. 488 (1959);
Johnston, Breach of Medical Confidence in Ohio, 19 AKRON L. REv. 373 (1986); O'Neill, Ohio's Physician-Patient
Privilege in Personal Injury Cases - Time for Reform, 16 W. RES. L. REV. 334 (1965); Stewart, Physician-Patient
Privilege in Ohio, 8 Ct.EVE.-MAR. L. REV. 444 (1959); Case Comment, Parisky v. Perstorff, 63 OhioApp. 503, 27N.E.2d
254 (1939), 7 OHIo ST. L.J. 92 (1941); and Case Comment, In Re Roberto, 106 Ohio App. 303, 151 N.E.2d 37 (1958),
28 U. Cit. L. REV. 534 (1959).
4. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 47.
6. 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 573 (1776), reprinted in NOTABLE BRIsT TRIALS ERIES (Melville ed. 1927), noted in 8
J. Wi.otORE, EviDEcF IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2380, at 818 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
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concerning a patient's physical or mental condition while testifying in court, no
breach of the physician-patient relationship resulted.
American courts initially followed the English precedent and refused to
recognize the physician-patient privilege. 7 In 1828, however, the state of New York,
through statutory innovation, established a physician-patient privilege.8 Revisers of
the New York statute justified this creation by stating:
The ground on which communications to counsel are privileged, is the supposed necessity
of a full knowledge of the facts, to advise correctly, and to prepare for the proper defence
or prosecution of a suit. But surely the necessity of consulting a medical adviser, when life
itself may be in jeopardy, is still stronger. And unless such consultations are privileged, men
will be incidentally punished by being obliged to suffer the consequences of injuries without
relief from the medical art, and without conviction of any offence. Besides, in such cases,
during the struggle between legal duty on the one hand, and professional honor on the other,
the latter, aided by a strong sense of the injustice and inhumanity of the rule, will, in most
cases, furnish a temptation to the perversion or concealment of truth, too strong for human
resistance. 9
Missouri followed New York's lead in 1835,10 and to date forty states and the District
of Columbia have adopted some form of the physician-patient privilege. " I
Even though most states that have adopted the physician-patient privilege have
embraced the same reasoning asserted by New York, some commentators still
discount any necessity for the physician-patient privilege. Professor Wigmore, for
example, believes more persuasive arguments stand against the physician-patient
privilege than stand for it. 12 According to Professor Wigmore, most communications
7. 8 J. WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2380, at 819 n.3 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
8. N.Y. REv. STAT. 406, § 73 (1828).
9. N.Y. REv. STAT. 737 (1836). New York lawmakers saw the adoption of the privilege as an encouragement for
those in need of medical assistance to seek it, See, e.g., Edington v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 185, 194 (1876).
10. WimoRE, supra note 7, at 820.
11. The following states have adopted a physician-patient privilege: Alaska, ALAsKA R. Ev1D. 504; Arizona, ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2235 (1982); Arkansas, ARK. R. EvID. 503; California, CAL. EviD. CODE 99 990-1007 (Vest 1966
& Supp. 1988); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-90-107(d) (1987); Delaware, DEL. UNIF. R. Evio. 503; District of
Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307 (1981 & Supp. 1988); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-40 (Supp. 1988); Hawaii,
HAW. R. Evio. 504 (1985); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 9-203.4 (1979 & Supp. 1988); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para.
8-802 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Vest 1983); Iowa, IowA CODE ANN. § 622.10
(Vest Supp. 1988); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60427 (1983); Louisiana, LA. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 15:476 (Vest 1981);
Maine, ME. R. EvID. 503; Michigan, MIcH. Cosip. LAws ANN. § 600.2157 ('West 1986); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 595.02(1)(d) (West 1988); Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-21 (Supp. 1987); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 491.060(5) (Vernon Supp. 1988); Montana, MONT. CODEANN. § 26-1-805 (1987); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-504
(1985); Nevada, Nsv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 49.215-.245 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1988); New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 329:26 (Supp. 1987); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.2 (Vest 1976); New York, N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
L. & R. 4504(a) (McKinney Supp. 1988); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1987); North Dakota, N.D. R. EviD.
503; Ohio, OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B) (Anderson Supp. 1987); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503
(\Vest Supp. 1988); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40.235 (Butterworth 1988); Pennsylvania, PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. tit.
42, § 5929 (Purdon 1982); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-37.3-4 (1987); South Dakota, S.D. ConnED LAWS
§§ 19-13-6 to -11 (Michie 1987); Texas, Tsx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.08 (Vernon Supp. 1988); Utah, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(4) (1987); Vermont,VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1612(a) (Supp. 1986); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-399 (1984); Washington, VASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(4) (Supp. 1988); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 905.04 (Vest Supp. 1987); Wyoming, WYo. STAT. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (1977).
Since each state's physician-patient privilege statute differs in scope and applicability, each statute should be
analyzed separately to determine whether the privilege attaches to a given situation. However, discussion in this Note may
be helpful to understand how the various provisions operate.
12. WiGMoPE, supra note 7, § 2380A, at 829-32.
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with a physician are not intended to be confidential in nature, because most ailments
are readily apparent;' 3 by merely observing the patient, one can ascertain the source
of the patient's ailments. Even when medical disorders are not readily identifiable,
friends and relatives often discuss their ailments openly, thereby making them known
to others outside the physician-patient relationship. 14
Further, Wigmore contends that patients will seek medical assistance and
disclose all relevant information without any privilege.t 5 In support of his assertion,
he indicates that citizens in states lacking the privilege do not suffer from inferior
medical care.16 Finally, he argues that nothing indicates that once the privilege is
established, long-concealed ailments are suddenly brought to the attention of medical
personnel. 17
Although Wigmore believes the physician-patient relationship should be fos-
tered, he contends that the concealment of medical information can cause greater
injury to justice than the disclosure of it. Is Patients may use the privilege to conceal
medical information when injuries are not as extensive as claimed' 9 or when the
patient is not injured at all; 20 thus, the patient is allowed to prevent opposing counsel
from obtaining vital information when preparing his2l case. Though these arguments
have merit, the physician should not have an unfettered right to discuss the patient's
physical and emotional problems unless so directed by the patient.
Prior to the adoption of the physician-patient privilege, a social stigma was
attached to those who suffered from disease. Out of fear of public ridicule, people
attempted to conceal their ailments and did not seek medical assistance. To eliminate
this hesitancy, early legislators adopted the physician-patient privilege, 22 which
enabled patients to discuss their medical disorders openly and without fear that others
would learn of their disease.
In addition, the right to privacy is an influential justification for the privilege. 23
Patients expect their communications with physicians to be held confidential. 24 The
13. Id. at 829.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 829-30.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 829.
18. Id. at 830.
19. City of Portsmouth v. Cilumbrello, 204 Va. 11, 15, 129 S.E.2d 31, 34 (1963). The city questioned the extent
of the defendant's injuries when the defendant fell through one of the city's manholes. Since Virginia waives the
physician-patient privilege when the patient's physical condition is at issue in a case, the city was permitted to receive a
copy of the defendant's medical reports, from which the extent of the patient's injuries could be determined.
20. Witotoa, supra note 7, § 2389, at 855.
21. The author wishes to acknowledge that throughout the Article masculine pronouns will be used. This in no way
infers that only individuals of the male gender experience problems with the physician-patient privilege. However, for the
sake of clarity, masculine pronouns will be used with the intent to refer to both genders.
22. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
23. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lanyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REv. 597, 618-19 (1980). Even
though Professor Wigmore argues that communications to physicians would be made even without the existence of a
physician-patient privilege, see VtoG.toas, supra note 7, § 2380a, at 829, there still exists the possibility that a patient may
desire his ailment to remain private, and thus would not disclose it due to the lack of a privilege.
24. See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text. One may argue that a patient's expectation that communica-
tions with his physician will remain confidential is based upon the fact that the physician-patient privilege has existed for
some time. While this assertion has some merit, the medical profession has practiced under the belief that communications
are to be held confidential even longer than the physician-patient privilege has existed. See infra note 148.
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privacy rationale seems more persuasive than any other in today's environment, in
which less social stigma is associated with seeking medical attention. 25
Proponents of the privilege seek to promote general health by assuring that
intimate details discussed with a physician will not generally be disclosed, and
thereby minimize the possibility of "humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace.' 26 It
has been argued that open communication between patients and medical personnel
will be fostered as well as the dissemination of all relevant information needed by
treating physicians to diagnose and treat their patients accurately. 27
Even though some may argue that the physician-patient privilege does not
promote general health in today's society, a basic assumption still exists that a patient
will feel more secure in disclosing his medical problems when he knows that they
cannot be openly discussed by the physician with others without the patient's prior
consent. This point can be better understood when dealing with mental disorders or
controversial diseases such as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (commonly
referred to as AIDS). 28 A patient should not be deprived of his right to associate
freely in society simply because a physician has acquired information concerning the
patient's physical or mental condition while treating the patient.29 If it were indeed
the case that physicians could freely disclose that an individual has contracted a
disease such as AIDS, surely fewer individuals susceptible to the disease would be
25. Medical attention is readily available today. In fact, numerous facilities have been constructed that cater to
emergency-related ailments. These facilities require no appointments and the physician on call will handle the problem,
eliminating the need to have a family physician. These facilities attempt to provide quick, efficient, and reliable care.
The number of hospitals has grown at a tremendous rate. Due to the large number of available beds, many hospitals
now advertise their facilities, indicating that medical care is available when one is in need. This openness to medical care
has eliminated the once apparent negative social stigma related to physical ailments. No longer is society ignorant about
the manner in which diseases are contracted; in fact, most friends and relatives offer their support and encouragement
when another is in need of care.
26. Note, The Physician-Patient Privilege, 56 Nw. U.L. Rev. 263, 266 (1961).
27. Note, The Scope of the Physician-Patient Privilege in Criminal Actions: A New Balancing Test, 64 NEB. L.
REv. 772, 773 (1985). See also Edington v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 185, 194 (1876). Interpreting the New York
statute, the court in Edington stated that the privilege:
•.. is a just and useful enactment, introduced to give protection to those who were in charge of physicians from
the secrets disclosed to enable them properly to prescribe for diseases of the patient. To open the door to the
disclosure of secrets revealed on the sick bed, or when consulting a physician, would destroy confidence
between the physician and the patient, and, it is easy to see, might tend very much to prevent the advantages
and benefits which flow from this confidential relationship.
28. See generally Carey & Arthur, The Developing Law on AIDS in the Workplace, 46 MD. L. REv. 284 (1987);
Leonard, AIDS and Employment Law Revisited, 14 HoFsmA L. REv. 11 (1985); Leonard, Employment Discrimination
Against Persons with AIDS, 10 U. DAY'rON L. REv. 681 (1985); Mawdsley, Commentary: Privacy Rights ofAIDS Victims,
31 W. Enuc. L. REP. 697 (1986); Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 707 (1987);
Comment, When Private Morality Becomes Public Concern: Homosexuality and Public Employment, 24 Hous. L. REv.
519 (1987); Note, Employment Discrimination and AIDS: Is AIDS a Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act?, 38 U. FLA. L. REv. 649 (1986); Comment, AIDS and Employment Discrimination Under the Federal Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 and Virginia's Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 20 U. Ritc. L. REv. 425 (1986); Note, Recent
Developments: Public Health and Employment Issues Generated by the AIDS Crisis, 25 VASHBURN L.J. 505 (1986); Note,
AIDS and Employment: An Epidemic Strikes the Workplace and the Law, 8 WnrrrrER L. REv. 651 (1986).
29. The reader should be warned, however, that under certain circumstances, a physician is legally required to
report infectious diseases to the appropriate health authority. See, for example, OHfo Rev. CoD ANN. § 3707.06
(Anderson Supp. 1987), where a treating physician is required to report the "name, age, sex, and color of the patient,
and the house and place in which the sick person may be found." Infectious diseases requiring reporting include "cholera,
plague, yellow fever, typhus fever, diphtheria, typhoid fever, or any other disease dangerous to the public health, or
required by the department of health." Id. While this reporting requirement may infringe upon the realm of privileged
communications between a physician and patient, the validity of statutes like § 3707.06 is beyond the scope of this Note.
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apt to seek medical assistance out of fear of being publicly humiliated or even losing
a job. 30 Ultimately, such actions would retard the medical profession's goal of
controlling and eliminating the disease.
Another basis for the privilege lies in the degree of influence that the medical
profession wields in the various state legislatures. 3 1 Physicians lobby for the
privilege, and their presence in the political arena allows them to be successful in
their pursuit. 32 The privilege is sought and retained to protect the "honor of their
profession."33
Even though there are varied views concerning the necessity of the physician-
patient privilege, it continues to thrive in the majority of states, and will likely
continue to do so in the future.3 4
B. History of the Physician-Patient Privilege in Ohio
Ohio first adopted a version of the physician-patient privilege in 1880. 3 5 Section
5241 of the Ohio Code stated that a physician could not testify "concerning a
communication made to him by his patient in that relation, or his advice to his
patient.''36 Further, the statute allowed the privilege to be waived by either the
express consent of the patient or his act of testifying voluntarily. 37 In either case, the
treating physician could be compelled to testify-if he did not voluntarily do so-
when the privilege had been waived. 38
The next version of the physician-patient privilege still allowed the patient to
waive his privilege through express consent or by testifying voluntarily about his
30. WVio.iosE, supra note 7, § 2380a, at 831.
31. See supra note 30.
32. The American Medical Association (AMA) has had a dramatic influence on the political arena. The AMA is
an organization that represents all practicing physicians. As proof of the AMA's influence upon legislation, from 1948
through 1962 the AMA was the top reported lobbying spender. J. DEAKIm, THE LoBBYrmS 240-43 (1966).
Besides joining the AMA, physicians contribute to the AMA's political causes. "The American Medical Political
Action Committee, political fund-raising arm of the A.M.A., claimed that one-fourth to one-third of the A.M.A.'s...
members had joined AMPAC." Id. at 242-43. Besides lobbying through registered lobbyists, the AMA also contributes
to political candidates. It has been noted that in this decade more than 90% of the House members have received at least
one contribution from the AMA. J. BERRY, THE INTEREsr GROUP SOCIMEr 174-75 (1984). This indicates that the AMA is
a very influential and powerful political interest organization. Due to the AMA's financial support, recipients of
contributions will listen very intently when an issue affecting the medical profession is introduced in Congress. This
author in no way espouses the idea that financial backing assures political success; however, human nature does tend to
give additional consideration to issues that affect financial supporters.
33. Wm:ioRE, supra note 7, § 2380a, at 830.
34. Most states recognize the physician-patient privilege. See supra note I1. To date, no state has withdrawn the
privilege after adopting it. In fact, the number of states recognizing the privilege has gradually grown.
35. OIo REv. STAT. § 5241(1) (1880). The early physician-patient privilege in Ohio stated:
The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:
I. [A] physician, concerning a communication made to him by his patient in that relation, or his advice to
his patient; but the . . . physician may testify by express consent of the . ., patient; and if the . . .patient
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injury. 39 In addition, the patient automatically waived the privilege by filing a
medical malpractice claim against the physician. 40 When a medical malpractice claim
was filed, the waiver only extended to essential issues in the suit.4 ' Further, if the
patient was deceased, the surviving spouse, executor, or administrator of the estate
could expressly waive the privilege. 42
In 1986, the General Assembly of the State of Ohio debated Senate Bill No.
330.43 Commonly referred to as the Tort Reform Act, this measure contained
proposed amendments modifying various tort principles within the state, including
the physician-patient privilege. 44 The Tort Reform Act attempted to level the playing
39. OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1986). The immediate predecessor to the current
physician-patient privilege stated:
The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:
(B) A physician concerning a communication made to him by his patient in that relation or his advice to
his patient, except that the physician may testify by express consent of the patient or, if the patient is deceased,
by the express consent of the surviving spouse or the executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased
patient and except that, if the patient voluntarily testifies or is deemed by section 2151.421 of the Revised Code
to have waived any testimonial privilege under this division, the physician may be compelled to testify on the
same subject, or if the patient, his executor or administrator, files a medical claim, as defined in division (D)(3)
of section 2305.11 of the Revised Code, the filing shall constitute a waiver of this privilege with regard to the
care and treatment of which complaint is made. This division applies to doctors of medicine, doctors of
osteopathic medicine, and doctors of podiatric medicine.
40. Id.
41. Otto v. Miami Valley Hosp. Soc'y, 26 Ohio Misc. 72, 75, 266 N.E.2d 270, 272 (1971). The court in Otto
determined that a physician may disclose communications in defending an action for malpractice. The Ohio Supreme
Court followed this view in Moore v. Grandview Hosp., 25 Ohio St. 3d 194, 495 N.E.2d 934 (1986), but refused to
extend the same status to a nondefendant physician. See also Awtry v. United States, 27 F.R.D. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(holding that the appropriate privileged communication statute does not apply in an action against the physician for
malpractice); Becknell v. Hosier, 10 Ind. App. 5, 37 N.E. 580 (1894); Terier v. Dare, 146 A.D. 375, 131 N.Y.S. 51
(1911).
42. See supra note 39.
43. Senate Bill 330 was introduced on February 19, 1986. It passed the Senate on February 27, 1986, by a vote
of 18 to 13. The House received the bill on March 28, 1986 and passed it on September 4, 1986, by a vote of 87 to 8.
The Senate refused to concur on the House amendments on November 12, 1986, by a vote of 29 to 0. The Senate refused
to pass a conference committee's report on November 12, 1986 by a vote of 15 to 15, whereas the House agreed to the
report by a vote of 78 to 17. A second Conference Committee report went to the Senate on the same day, where the Senate
and House both agreed to the committee's report by a vote of 20 to 10 and 69 to 16, respectively. The Bill went to
Governor Celeste on December 12, 1986, and he vetoed it on December 19, 1986. The Senate attempted to override the
Governor's veto on December 23, 1986, but the objection was sustained by a vote of 19 to 12. Thus, the Tort Reform
Act was not passed in 1986. 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 3-26 (Baldwin).
44. The Tort Reform Act of 1987 has impacted virtually every area of civil litigation.
[The Act made] numerous changes in civil justice law relative to evidence in wrongful death and other tort cases;
complaints in certain tort actions; the disclosure and deduction of collateral benefits; punitive or exemplary
damages; joint and several liability in comparative negligence actions; the physician-patient testimonial
privilege; frivolous conduct in civil actions; periodic payments of certain future damages awards; and contingent
fee agreements and attorney's closing statements.
[The Act] establishe[d] a comprehensive statutory scheme to govern product liability claims.
[The Act further] ma[kes] changes in insurance law to authorize state banks and savings and loan
associations to invest in domestic property/casualty reinsurance companies; to clarify and strengthen the
regulatory powers of the Superintendent of Insurance; to regulate insurance company termination of independent
insurance agents' contracts and their customers' policies; to require the Superintendent to adopt a rule to require
certain commercial insurers to file, with their annual reports, detailed supplemental reports for certain specified
types of commercial insurance; to establish the Ohio Commercial Market Assistance Plan (MAP) and a standby
Ohio Commercial Joint Underwriting Association to be placed in operation if the MAP is unsuccessful; to
establish "prior approval" requirements for property/casualty insurers' adoption of any form of policy,
endorsement, or rider and also, if a rule is adopted, for specified lines of commercial insurance coverage; to
regulate the cancellation, nonrenewal, and conditional nonrenewal of commercial insurance policies; and to
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field in a civil justice system where a heavy preference had been given to
defendants. 45 The Tort Reform Act, as proposed in 1986, however, never passed. 46
The Act was reintroduced in 1987, passed the General Assembly, met with the
Governor's approval, and became effective on January 5, 1988. 47 Thus, a major
overhaul of the civil justice system was accomplished in Ohio, which included some
dramatic changes in the physician-patient privilege.
HI. THE CURRENT STANDING OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE UNDER OHIO
REVISED CODE SECTION 2317.02
The revised version of section 2317.0248 has expanded the number of ways by
which the physician-patient privilege may be waived. The patient or a guardian may
establish and specify the duties of a joint select committee to be known as the Insurance/Civil Justice Reform
Review Committee.
1987 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-839 (Baldwin).
For further discussion concerning the Tort Reform Act of 1987 and the various provisions affected, see OHIO LEGAL
CENrER INsTrrrE, TilE NEw TORT RErot.tst Acts OF 1987 (1987).
45. Telephone interview with Representative John Shivers, Democrat from Columbiana County, District 3 (Nov.
5, 1987). Representative Shivers drafted the current language in Ohio Revised Code § 2317.02.
46. See supra note 43.
47. House Bill I was introduced on January 14, 1987. The Tort Reform Act passed the House on February 17,
1987, by a vote of 82 to 12. The Senate Select Committee on Tort Reform received the bill on February 17, 1987. The
Senate passed the bill on June 24, 1987, by a vote of 19 to 13. A conference committee made recommendations
concerning the Tort Reform Act and both the House and Senate approved the committee's recommendations. The House
passed the recommendations on September 24, 1987, by a vote of 76 to 16, and the Senate passed the recommendations
on September 30, 1987, by a vote of 19 to 13. Governor Celeste signed the Tort Reform Act on October 5, 1987, making
it effective on January 5, 1988. 1987 Ohio Legis. Serv. 3-3 (Baldwin).
48. Outo REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Anderson Supp. 1987). The provisions of § 2317.02 that relate to the
physician-patient privilege are as follows:
The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:
(B)(I) A physician concerning a communication made to him by his patient in that relation or his advice
to his patient, except as otherwise provided in this division and division (B)(2) of this section, and except that,
if the patient is deemed by section 2151.421 [2151.42.1] of the Revised Code to have waived any testimonial
privilege under this division, the physician may be compelled to testify on the same subject.
The testimonial privilege under this division is waived, and a physician may testify or may be compelled
to testify in a civil action, in accordance with the discovery provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure in
connection with a civil action, or in connection with a claim under Chapter 4123. of the Revised Code, under
the following circumstances:
(a) If the patient or the guardian or other legal representative of the patient gives express consent;
(b) If the patient is deceased, the spouse of the patient or his executor or administrator gives express
consent;
(c) If a medical claim, dental claim, chiropractic claim, or optometric claim, as defined in section 2305.11
of the Revised Code, an action for wrongful death, any other type of civil action, or a claim under Chapter 4123.
of the Revised Code is filed by the patient, the personal representative of the patient if deceased or of his estate,
or his guardian or other legal representative.
(2) If the testimonial privilege described in division (B)(I) of this section is waived as provided in division
(B)(1)(c) of this section, a physician may be compelled to testify or to submit to discovery under the Rules of
Civil Procedure only as to a communication made to him by the patient in question in that relation, or his advice
to the patient in question, that related causally or historically to physical or mental injuries that are relevant to
issues in the medical claim, dental claim, chiropractic claim, or optometric claim, action for wrongful death,
other civil action, or claim under Chapter 4123. of the Revised Code.
(3) As used in divisions (B)(1) and (2) of this section, "communication" means acquiring, recording, or
transmitting any information, in any manner, concerning any facts, opinions, or statements necessary to enable
a physician to diagnose, treat, prescribe, or act for a patient. A "communication" may include, but is not
limited to, any medical, office, or hospital communication such as a record, chart, letter, memorandum,
laboratory test and results, X-ray, photograph, financial statement, diagnosis, or prognosis.
(4) Divisions (B)(1), (2), and (3) of this section apply to doctors of medicine, doctors of osteopathic
medicine, and doctors of podiatric medicine.
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expressly consent to the waiver. 49 If the patient is deceased, either the surviving
spouse, executor, or administrator may waive the privilege by express consent.50
Further, the filing of either a malpractice claim, wrongful death action, worker's
compensation claim, or any other civil action constitutes a compulsory waiver of the
physician-patient privilege.5 1
Section 2317.02 also defines which types of communications may be obtained
from the administering physician, as well as the process that opposing counsel must
use to obtain that information. 52 This Note discusses each waiver separately and the
procedure that must be followed when retrieving medical information from the
patient's physician. Case law from other jurisdictions is relied upon in interpreting the
major changes in the physician-patient privilege in Ohio, since such case law will
likely provide persuasive authority for Ohio courts as they endeavor to interpret the
new provisions under section 2317.02.
A. Express Waivers Through Written Consent
As early as 1880, when the physician-patient privilege was first enacted in Ohio,
a patient could expressly waive his privilege. 53 After the 1953 amendment,5 4 spouses,
executors, or administrators could expressly waive the physician-patient privilege for
the decedent. Since the scope of these express waivers is closely associated, they will
be analyzed together.
A patient may voluntarily waive his statutory privilege by way of an express
waiver 55 without violating public policy. 56 The waiver may even be promulgated
before the patient receives any treatment. 57 The courts, however, will scrutinize such
49. Id. at § 2317.02(B)(l)(a).
50. Id. at § 2317.02(B)(1)(b).
51. Id. at § 2317.02(B)(1)(c).
52. Id. at § 2317.02(B)(2), (3).
53. See supra note 35.
54. Osno REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(A) (Anderson 1954).
55. Ausdenmoore v. Holzback, 89 Ohio St. 381, 383, 106 N.E. 41 (1914). An express waiver is procured either
through the consent of the patient or "by the patient taking the stand and voluntarily testifying as to the . . . matters
communicated to his physician." Id. at 383, 106 N.E. at 41. The latter is to be interpreted as an express waiver with
respect to the treating physician.
56. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 116 Ohio St. 693, 158 N.E. 176 (1927). The court determined that the
insured could waive his privileged right to confidential medical information when applying for life insurance. "To hold
otherwise would be to open wide the doors of both fraud and suicide with respect to the procuring of life insurance
policies, and it would jeopardize the soundness and safety of life insurance in general." Id. at 702-03, 158 N.E. at 179.
See also Torbensen v. Family Life Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 401, 329 P.2d 596 (1958); Crest Catering Co. v. Superior
Court, 62 Cal. 2d 274, 398 P.2d 150, 42 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1965); George v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 144 Neb. 285, 13
N.W.2d 176 (1944); Oklahoma Protective Ass'n v. Montgomery, 160 Okla. 135, 16 P.2d 135 (1932).
57. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 10 Ohio App. 2d 137, 140, 226 N.E.2d 760, 762 (1967). In Jackson,
the court held that an insured could effectively waive his privilege prior to any occurrence of physical ailment. The policy
read as follows:
... The injured person shall submit to physical exminations by physicians selected by the company when and
as often as the company may reasonably require and he, or in the event of his incapacity, his legal
representative, or in the event of his death his legal representative or the person or persons entitled to sue
therefore, shall upon each request from the Company, execute authorization to enable the Company to obtain
medical reports and copies of records.
Id. at 138-39, 226 N.E.2d at 761 (emphasis added by the court). Even though the patient could waive his
physician-patient privilege, the waiver did not permit the insurer to conduct ex parte interviews. See infra notes 133-84
and accompanying text.
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a waiver to protect the patient's interests.58 The waiver may specify the applicable
dates, 59 or it may waive certain communications while it retains the privilege for
others. 60 Therefore, drafters of an express waiver-whether written on behalf of the
patient, spouse, executor, or administrator-should proceed with caution in order to
limit the waiver to only those items intended to be waived.
Public policy also allows the use of broad waivers. In New York Life Insurance
Co. v. Snyder,6' the court noted that broad waivers of the physician-patient privilege
should be enforceable in order to prevent insurance fraud. The waiver in Snyder
stated:
I expressly waive, on behalf of myself and of any person who shall have or claim any
interest in any policy issued hereunder, all provisions of law forbidding any physician or
other person who has heretofore attended or examined me, or who may hereafter attend or
examine me, from disclosing any knowledge or information which he thereby acquired.62
As indicated by Synder, drafters of waivers have the right to make them as broad
or as narrow as the drafters wish. In addition, a patient who signs a broad waiver
while intending to waive only a narrow right can unintentionally waive more than he
desires. For these reasons, a patient should carefully scrutinize any waiver before he
signs.
B. Compulsory Waiver Due to the Filing of an Action
Section 2317.02(B)(1)(c) of the Ohio Revised Code recognizes a compulsory
waiver of the physician-patient privilege by the filing of a claim for malpractice,
wrongful death, worker's compensation, or "any other type of civil action." '63
Before the General Assembly's adoption of a waiver when a medical malpractice
claim has been filed,64 judicial recognition of such a waiver occurred in Otto v.
Miami Valley Hospital Society. 65 The court applied the waiver in medical malpractice
cases, even though one year earlier it had determined in State ex rel. Lambdin v.
58. Id. at 141-42, 226 N.E.2d at 762-63.
59. Pride v. Inter-State Bus. Men's Accid. Ass'n, 207 Iowa 167, 216 N.W. 62 (1927) (waiving of privileged
communications up to the time of examination does not constitute a waiver as to communications made to physicians after
such time); Geare v. United States Life Ins. Co., 66 Minn. 91, 68 N.W. 731 (1896) (waiving the right to privileged
communications subsequent to the date of application does not constitute a waiver for medical treatments that occurred
prior to the application date).
60, Baker v. Industrial Comm'n, 135 Ohio St. 491, 21 N.E.2d 593 (1939) (testifying as to the condition of the
patient's leg waives the privilege concerning communications about that leg only). See also In Re De Neef, 42 Cal. App.
2d 691, 109 P.2d 741 (1941) (waiver of the physician-patient privilege does not extend to a waiver of privileged
communications between husband and wife); Noble v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 471, 297 N.W. 881 (1941)
(waiving privileged communications in an application for insurance without mentioning a testimonial waiver allows the
patient to retain the testimonial privilege and thus bars the physician from revealing privileged communications in a court
of law).
61. 116 Ohio St. 693, 158 N.E. 176 (1927).
62. Id. at 698-99, 158 N.E. at 178.
63. See supra note 48, at § 2317.02(B)(1)(c).
64. The 1954 version of the physician-patient privilege did not recognize a waiver when a medical malpractice case
had been instituted. The medical malpractice waiver was not recognized until the decision in Otto v. Miami Valley Hosp.
Soc'y, 26 Ohio Misc. 72, 266 N.E.2d 270 (1971). See OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(A) (Anderson 1954).
65. 26 Ohio Misc. 72, 266 N.E.2d 270 (1971). In making this determination, the court followed Hartley v.
Calbreath, 127 Mo. App. 559, 106 S.W. 570 (1908).
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Brenton66 that only statutory waivers would be recognized. The Otto court cited
Brenton, but held without elaboration that the Brenton precedent did "not approach
the threshold of the question" raised in Otto.
67
In Otto, the plaintiffs filed a malpractice action claiming "that behind the veil
of professional secrecy and of privilege some wrong was done, and that they need not
plead and they cannot be compelled to disclose to the court what wrongdoing took
place.'"68 The court, however, determined that a trial without disclosure of specific
issues denied due process and offended the rationale underlying discovery, and thus
held the privilege inapplicable. 69 The General Assembly later codified this rationale
into the physician-patient privilege. 70
The physician-patient privilege also recognizes that the privilege is waived when
a worker's compensation action is filed,71 but such was not always the case. In State
ex rel. Galloway v. Industrial Commission,72 the court determined that the Industrial
Commission could not require an applicant, as a prerequisite to consideration of his
claim, to sign and file a waiver. As late as 1984, the Ohio Supreme Court in State ex
rel. Holman v. Dayton Press, Inc.73 determined that the Commission could not avoid
its duty to consider an applicant's claim because there was no express waiver of the
physician-patient privilege. 74
Since the language granting compulsory waivers when malpractice and worker's
compensation claims are filed is relatively straightforward, litigation in these areas
should be scarce. Applying a compulsory waiver, however, when a personal injury
action is instituted may pose a greater problem for courts applying Ohio law. Indeed,
the compulsory waiver of the physician-patient privilege upon the filing of a wrongful
death action or "any other type of civil action" marks the most dramatic change in
Ohio Revised Code section 2317.02.
Before the Tort Reform Act of 1987, Ohio did not recognize a compulsory
waiver of the physician-patient privilege upon the mere filing of a personal injury
action. 75 Although the issue had previously confronted the Ohio Supreme Court in
66. 21 Ohio St. 2d 21, 254 N.E.2d 681 (1970).
67. Otto, 26 Ohio Misc. at 73, 266 N.E.2d at 271.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 75-76, 266 N.E.2d at 273. The court substantiated its decision with the following analogy: "A case
without facts is without issues and is as futile of purpose as a plumber without piping or a brick mason without bricks;
neither funtion [sic] without the wherewithal upon which they operate. Without bricks a house is not built; without issues
a cause does not exist." Id. at 75, 266 N.E.2d at 273.
70. See supra note 39.
71. See supra note 48, at § 2317.02(B)(1)(c). Worker's compensation claims are filed under Outo REv. CoDE ANN.
chapter 4123. (Anderson Supp. 1987).
72. 134 Ohio St. 496, 17 N.E.2d 918 (1938). The injured employee filed a claim with the Industrial Commission
when a cleaning compound was thrown in his face during the course of his employment. The injury resulted in a loss of
his vision-a permanent total disability. The Industrial Commission refused to act upon his claim until he executed a
waiver for the privileged communications he had had with his treating physician. The court stated that the Industrial
Commission did not have the power to promulgate rules in contradiction with the physician-patient privilege. Relief was
available to the injured employee without exposing his privileged communications.
73. 11 Ohio St. 3d 66, 463 N.E.2d 1243 (1984).
74. The court stated that "[t]he commission is under a clear legal duty to consider appellee's claim without
restricting his substantive rights. Where, as here, a claimant must waive the physician-patient privilege as a condition
precedent to consideration of his claim, an abuse of discretion has been shown .. ." Id. at 69, 463 N.E.2d at 1245.
75. See supra note 39.
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State ex rel. Lambdin v. Brenton,76 the court refused to adopt such a notion judicially,
and instead left the legislature with the responsibility of adopting a solution. The
court noted that until the legislature adopted such a change, "a personal injury litigant
does not waive the physician-patient privilege merely by filing his petition, and a
court seeking to compel disclosure of personal medical records exceeds its
jurisdiction." ' 77 By strictly construing the physician-patient privilege and adhering
only to statutory waivers, Brenton apparently ignored the reasoning of other
jurisdictions that had judicially recognized such a waiver. 78
Mandatory waiver upon the filing of a personal injury lawsuit is a principle
whose time has come. As noted in City of San Francisco v. Superior Court:79
The whole purpose of the privilege is to preclude the humiliation of the patient that might
follow disclosure of his ailments. When the patient himself discloses those ailments by
bringing an action in which they are in issue, there is no longer any reason for the privilege.
The patient-litigant exception precludes one who has placed in issue his physical condition
from invoking the privilege on the ground that disclosure of his condition would cause him
humiliation. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. 80
Thus, if the physical condition of the patient is at issue in a case, it would be a
burlesque upon logic to allow the patient to claim the privilege. 8' A patient should not
have the right to use the figurative sword by commencing an action based on personal
injuries, yet at the same time shield himself from discovery mechanisms by using the
physician-patient privilege. The Ohio General Assembly has recognized the logic in
this argument.
Pursuant to section 2317.02, a compulsory waiver is recognized when "any...
type of civil action" 82 is filed by an injured party. This language appears to allow an
extensive application. 83 Therefore, defining the scope of the waiver may pose
problems for courts. To provide some guidance upon the limitation of this apparently
boundless waiver, this Note analyzes the ways in which other jurisdictions with
similar statutes have addressed this issue.8 4
76. 21 Ohio St. 2d 21, 254 N.E.2d 681 (1970).
77. Id. at 24, 254 N.E.2d at 683.
78. The following jurisdictions have created a judicial waiver of the physician-patient privilege upon the
commencement of a suit: Colorado. Kelley v. Holmes, 28 Colo. App. 79, 470 P.2d 590 (1970); District of Columbia,
Sklagen v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp.. 625 F. Supp. 991 (D.D.C. 1984); Indiana, Collins v. Bair. 256 Ind.
230, 268 N.E.2d 95 (1971); Missouri. State exrel. McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. 1968); New York, Mancinelli
v. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 34 A.D.2d 535, 308 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1970); Vermont, Mattison v. Poulen, 134 Vt. 158,
353 A.2d 327 (1976).
Alaska had previously adopted the waiver through judicial innovation in Mathis v. Hilderbrand, 416 P.2d 8 (Alaska
1966), but the waiver is now codified under A.As.A R. EvIt. 504(d)(1).
79. 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951).
80. Id. at 232, 231 P.2d at 28.
81. WGNTORE. supra note 7, § 2389, at 855-61. Professor Wigmore stated that:
By any other conclusion the law practically permits the plaintiffto make a claim somewhat as follows: "'I tender
witnesses A. B and C. who will openly prove the severe nature of my injury. But I object to the testimony of
witness D, a physician called by the opponent to prove that my injury is not so severe as I claim, because it is
extremely repugnant to me that my neighbors should learn the nature of my injury!" Id. at 855.
82. See supra note 48. at § 2317.02(B)(1)(c).
83. See supra note 45.
84. For jurisdictions that have judicially adopted the compulsory waiver, see supra note 78.
The following jurisdictions have codified the compulsory waiver: Alabama, ALA. COoE § 15-23-1 1(a) (Supp. 1987)
(although Alabama does not recognize the physician-patient privilege, Arthers v. State, 459 So. 2d 972 (1984), it has
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Jurisdictions that have enacted statutes waiving the physician-patient privilege
when a personal injury action is commenced have recognized the waiver when the
health of the plaintiff is placed at issue.8 5 Clearly, when a plaintiff files a medical
malpractice, worker's compensation, wrongful death, or other type of civil action
seeking damages for the physical injury caused by another, the plaintiff effectively
places his health at issue. 86 A typical case exemplifying this proposition is Galindo
v. Riddell, Inc.,87 in which the plaintiff sought recovery for personal injuries he
allegedly suffered while wearing a defective football helmet. Since the plaintiff
placed his physical condition at issue by filing the action, the plaintiff's physician
was permitted to testify despite the plaintiff's objections. The court held that the
plaintiff's physician-patient privilege had been waived by commencement of the
action. Thus, one would expect that section 2317.02 would also waive the privilege
when a plaintiff places his health at issue in a lawsuit. 88
Most states, 89 however, apply the compulsory waiver when the patient places his
physical condition at issue. This differs semantically from Ohio where the compul-
sory waiver is instituted when an action is filed by the patient.90 Even though the
language in the various state statutes may differ, 9' the effect should be the same:
When the physical condition of a plaintiff is at issue in a case, the physician-patient
privilege should be waived when the communication relates to the ailment at issue.
Since a plaintiff chooses to file a lawsuit, he voluntarily places his physical condition
statutorally recognized a waiver when a claim is filed by a victim of crime); Alaska, ALASKA R. EVID. 504(d)(1); Arkansas,
ARK. R. EvID. 503(d)(3); California, CAL. EVID. CODE § 996 (West 1966); Delaware, DEL. UNIF. R. Evio. 503(d)(3);
Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-40 (Supp. 1988); Hawaii, HAw. R. EvIo. 504(d)(3) (1985); Idaho, IDAHO CODE
§ 9-203.4(C) (1979 & Supp. 1988); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-802(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); Iowa,
IOwA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (Vest Supp. 1988); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-427(d) (1983); Maine, ME. R. EvID.
503(e)(3); Michigan, MICH. Cosip. LAws ANN. § 600.2157 (Vest 1986); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(5) (West
1988); Mississippi, MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-21 (Supp. 1987); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504(4)(c) (1985); Nevada,
NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.245(3) (1986 & Supp. 1988); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.4 (Vest 1976);
North Dakota, N.D. R. EviD. 503(d)(3); Ohio, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B)(1)(c) (Anderson Supp. 1987);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503(D)(3) (Vest Supp. 1988); South Dakota, S.D. CoDIFIED lAws § 19-13-11
(Michie 1987); Texas, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.08(g)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1988); Virginia, VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-399 (1984); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(4)(b) (Supp. 1988); Wisconsin, Wts. STAT.
ANN. § 905.04(4)(c) (Vest Supp. 1987).
85. See City of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951); Green v. Superior Court,
220 Cal. App. 2d 121, 33 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1963); Galindo v. Riddell, Inc., 107 111. App. 3d 139, 437 N.E.2d 376 (1982);
Werner v. Kliewer, 238 Kan. 289, 710 P.2d 1250 (1985); Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 240 N.W.2d 333
(1976); Hoffmeyer v. Pell, 23 Pa. D. & C.3d 448 (1982); City of Portsmouth v. Cilumbrello, 204 Va. 11, 129 S.E.2d
31(1963).
86. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
87. 107 I11. App. 3d 139, 437 N.E.2d 376 (1982).
88. This would indeed promote the efficient operation of our judicial system. If the patient were permitted to
withhold his communications with his treating physician, then defense counsel would not be able to obtain the plaintiff's
medical information necessary for his case. Defense counsel, under the immediate predecessor to § 2317.02, had to wait
until the patient voluntarily revealed the privileged communications. At this juncture, defense counsel would have to
request a recess to examine the newly acquired information. This is not an efficient use of the court's time. See also Rice,
Physician-Patient Privilege - A Significant Problem for Counsel?, 20 OHIo A. CIv. TRIAL ATry's, Spring 1985, at 2.
89. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-23-1 l(a) (Supp. 1987); CAL. EVID. CODE § 996 (\Vest 1966); DsL. UNiv. R. EvID.
503(D)(3) (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-40 (Supp. 1988); HAw. R. EviD. 504(d)(3) (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10
(Vest Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-427(d) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504(4)(c) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 49.245(B) (1986 & Supp. 1988); N.D. R. EvID. 503(d)(3); S.D. CODIIED LAws § 19-13-11 (Michie 1987); and Vts.
STAT. ANN. § 905.04(4)(c) (Vest Supp. 1987).
90. See supra note 48.
91. See supra note 89.
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at issue. Thus, when the waiver is being applied to a plaintiff, "filing" should be
equivalent to "placing at issue" since the act of filing a lawsuit effectively places the
plaintiff's condition at issue in the case.
States applying a waiver when the plaintiff places his own condition at issue in
the suit have debated, however, on whether the waiver also applies to a defendant.
The question thus becomes whether a defendant will be held to a compulsory waiver
of the privilege even though he did not initiate the action. The court in Branch v.
Wilkinson92 held that a party does not place his physical condition at issue in a suit
when he "merely denies allegations by the opposing party concerning his
condition." 93 In Branch, the defendant was charged with being intoxicated while
driving his automobile. The plaintiff, knowing that a blood sample had been taken
from the defendant, asserted that the defendant was driving under the influence of
alcohol. The defendant did not want the results of the blood sample made public, so
he claimed the physician-patient privilege and denied the allegations. The court
determined that if a denial placed the defendant's physical condition at issue, "the
defendant would be placed in the position of either admitting plaintiff's allegations
of intoxication, or else foregoing the privilege. We do not believe that the
physician-litigant exception was intended to work such a result." 94 Thus, following
Branch, a mere denial of the plaintiff's allegations may not be equivalent to placing
a defendant's physical condition at issue in a suit.
The decision in Branch, however, appears to contradict the theory underlying
the physician-patient privilege. Once a patient has referred to communications with
his physician, it would be absurd to continue to permit that patient to claim the
physician-patient privilege. 95 Even though this author believes that the purpose of the
privilege is no longer justified when the physical condition of any patient is placed
at issue before the court-whether it be through a claim or defense-a strict
construction of section 2317.02 may lead to the opposite conclusion.
In State v. Tu,96 an Ohio court held that a denial by a defendant places the
defendant's physical condition at issue and automatically waives the physician-
patient privilege. The defendant in Tu was charged with both driving while
intoxicated and vehicular homicide. While the defendant was being examined at a
hospital, a blood sample was taken. In an attempt to exclude the test results from
evidence, the defendant asserted his physician-patient privilege. The court held that
"[i]n the context of a criminal prosecution for driving while intoxicated . . . [b]y
tendering a plea of 'not guilty' to the offense charged, [the defendant] thereby placed
in issue each essential element, including (obviously) the element requiring proof of
his intoxication. '97 The court continued:
92. 198 Neb. 649, 256 N.W.2d 307 (1977).
93. Id. at 662, 256 N.W.2d at 315. See also Koump v. Smith, 25 N.Y.2d 287, 250 N.E.2d 857, 303 N.Y.S.2d
858 (1969). The court in Koump determined that the mere denial of an allegation does not waive the physician-patient
privilege.
94. Branch, 198 Neb. at 662, 256 N.W.2d at 315.
95. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
96. 17 Ohio App. 3d 159, 478 N.E.2d 830 (1984).
97. Id. at 163, 478 N.E.2d at 834.
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[The defendant's] plea of "not guilty" put his physical condition in issue. Yet, in
asserting his physical condition as an element of the crime, an element to be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, [the defendant] is simultaneously seeking to invoke an evidentiary
privilege to preclude the prosecution from establishing precisely that element. This is
patently unfair to a party [the prosecutiop] already bearing extremely heavy burdens of proof
and persuasion. . . . [E]vidence of the defendant's blood-alcohol test, if otherwise
competent, is exceedingly relevant-indeed, vitally necessary-to proof of guilt. To allow
the privilege to suppress that evidence would be to thwart the state's ability to offer the best
evidence of guilt; it would, moreover, permit a defendant to evade the penalties therefor with
impunity. 9s
Although the issues in Tu concerned the privilege in the criminal context, 99 the
same theory may be used to justify a waiver whenever a defendant's physical
condition is placed at issue in a civil suit. Once the defendant's physical condition is
placed at issue, justice will not prevail if the defendant is permitted to claim the
privilege. The defendant's physical condition may be an extremely relevant issue,
especially if he is asked to confirm or deny aspects of that condition.
Due to the express language of section 2317.02, however, it appears that a
defendant in a suit cannot "file" a claim or action by merely denying an allegation
asserted by the plaintiff or the prosecution. 100 This contemporary interpretation of
section 2317.02 differs from the result reached in Tu. In an attempt to justify the
General Assembly's apparent limitation of the compulsory waiver for a defendant,
one could argue that when a plaintiff "files" a claim or action, he does so upon his
own initiative. Therefore, he is voluntarily placing his physical condition at issue in
the case. Alternatively, the defendant sits in a defensive posture and must respond to
the allegations or lose the pleading. The General Assembly may have placed great
weight upon the fact that the defendant is not a party of his own free will and thus
should not be forced to abandon his physician-patient privilege due to accusations
made by the plaintiff. By requiring "filing" as opposed to merely placing the
patient's condition at issue before instituting a compulsory waiver, it appears that the
Ohio General Assembly has protected a defendant's medical communications when
a defendant denies the plaintiff's allegations. '0'
Additional credence for strictly construing section 2317.02 may be established
when the goal is to prevent the plaintiff from improperly using the courts to obtain
privileged medical information. Without such protection, a plaintiff could file an
action with little or no basis and force the defendant to waive the privilege when he
denies the complaint.
However, if the physical condition of the defendant is affirmatively raised by
"filing" a complaint or defense against the plaintiff, the defendant should be deemed
98. Id. (emphasis in original).
99. Distinguishing between procedural safeguards in the civil and criminal context is beyond the scope of this Note.
The reader is cautioned to consult resources dealing with the acquisition and use of evidence in the criminal setting in order
to fully appreciate the differences in both areas.
However, it should be noted that § 2317.02 specifically states that filing any type of civil action waives the privilege.
See supra note 48.
100. See supra note 48.
101. Id.
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to have waived the privilege since he has placed his condition at issue in the suit. 0 2
Although section 2317.02(B)(1)(c) waives the physician-patient privilege only upon
the "filing" of a lawsuit instead of merely placing the patient's physical condition at
issue, a defendant can "file" an action without being a plaintiff. Therefore, it is
believed that section 2317.02 will be applicable to defendants as well as plaintiffs
only under limited circumstances. For example, when a defendant submits a
counterclaim, 0 3 he should be deemed to have "filed" a claim and thus have placed
at issue his own physical condition.14 Since counterclaims are affirmative pleadings
required to be filed with the court, they should fall under the auspices of section
2317.02. Thus, a party to a personal injury suit should be able to obtain a defendant's
medical communications when the defendant files a claim that places his medical
condition in issue.
It is further believed that the compulsory waiver of the physician-patient
privilege does not apply to witnesses. Witnesses cannot "file" causes of action in a
legal proceeding as required by section 2317.02.to5 Even jurisdictions, such as
California, that allow the waiver when the patient places his physical condition "at
issue" have determined that the patient-litigant exception to the privilege does not
apply to witnesses. ' 0 6
The final issue that must be resolved is the extent to which the compulsory
waiver is applicable when a claim is filed under section 2317.02. Should the scope
102. A defendant who does notfile an action as required by OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 does not waive the
physician-patient privilege. See supra note 48. An affirmative action must be performed by the defendant to waive the
privilege. For examples of how a defendant can affirmatively waive the privilege byfiling a cause of action, see infra note
104.
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 13; OHto R. Civ. P. 13.
104. If the defendant has a claim against the plaintiff in the action, he may assert a counterclaim against the plaintiff.
ED. R. Civ. P. 13; Onio R. Civ. P. 13. This encourages all disputes between the parties to be resolved in one action to
promote judicial efficiency. Since the process of entering a counterclaim is equivalent to the process for a complaint,
placing the plaintiff in a defensive posture, then thefiling of a counterclaim shall waive the physician-patient testimonial
privilege. See supra note 48.
The same holds true when a cross-claim is filed by one defendant against another defendant, or by one plaintiff
against another plaintiff. Federal civil rule 13(g) and Ohio civil rule 13(G) "... permit, but [they do] not ... compel,
co-parties to assert against one another claims that bear certain prescribed relations to the rest of the controversy .... "
R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN, AND D. CLF O.r, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 464-65 (5th ed. 1984).
Again, since cross-claims are affirmative assertions against other parties, they should be deemed to have been filed as
required by Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02. See supra note 48.
105. A witness is not classified as a party required by both federal and Ohio civil rule 7 to file a complaint, nor is
a witness a party who may file a counterclaim. FED. R. Civ. P. 13; OHIO R. Civ. P. 13. A party is a litigant in an action
who is either asserting or defending a claim. Alternatively, a witness is merely one who testifies to what he has seen,
heard, or otherwise observed. Wigginton v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 126 F.2d 659, 666
(C.C.A. Ind.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 636 (1942).
106. Jones v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 546, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148, 155 (1981). In Jones, a woman
brought an action against various drug companies who manufactured a drug that the plaintiff's mother had taken while
pregnant with the plaintiff. The court noted that although the mother was closely allied with the plaintiff in the lawsuit
(since the alleged injury took place while the mother was pregnant with the plaintiff), the mother's physician-patient
privilege was not automatically waived since the mother was a witness who was not a party to the proceeding. However,
the witness did voluntarily testify that she ingested the drug and the circumstances surrounding the need for such a drug.
The court determined that, since she disclosed a significant portion of her communication with her physician without
coercion, the privilege had been waived only concerning those disclosed communications. CAL. EviD. CODE § 912 (vest
1966 & Supp. 1988).
Under the current physician-patient privilege in Ohio, see supra note 48, even if the witness did voluntarily testify
as to her communications with her physician, since she was a witness and did not file a cause of action, the
physician-patient privilege would still protect the mother. See infra notes 185-202 and accompanying text.
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of the waiver be limited or expansive? If opposing counsel were entitled to unlimited
discovery, patients might be deterred from filing personal-injury suits. They would be
afraid of opening up all past physician-oriented communications. This "would
clearly be an intolerable and overbroad intrusion into the patient's privacy, not
sufficiently limited to the legitimate state interest embodied in the provision, and
would create opportunities for harassment and blackmail."' 1 7 Not everyone, how-
ever, believes that expansive discovery would facilitate the dissemination of relevant
medical information. In fact, many commentators believe that fear of disclosing
irrelevant medical history has not deterred any claimant from resorting to
litigation. 108
Support for expansive discovery rests upon the theory that plaintiffs should not
be allowed unbridled discretion in determining the relevancy of their own medical
information. If plaintiffs were permitted to determine what medical information was
relevant, they would "serve as their own medical experts, picking and choosing
between various injuries and diseases and deciding for themselves which are, or are
not, relevant to the injuries which they presently claim.""°9 Injuries that appear to be
irrelevant to a plaintiff may be extremely relevant to a medical expert. Thus,
expansive discovery would eliminate the confusion concerning the relevancy of a
prior injury. If a defendant clearly caused a plaintiff's injuries, the plaintiff's prior
medical records would confirm his theory." 0 The plaintiff should have nothing to
hide.
Most courts, however, hold that commencing an action waives the physician-
patient privilege for the specific injury from which the dispute arises. Unlimited
release of lifetime medical information is an overbroad intrusion."' The patient-
litigant exception to the privilege acts not as a complete waiver, but rather "only as
a limited waiver concomitant with the purposes of the exception." " 2 The permissible
scope of inquiry must be limited to the nature and extent of physical injury that the
litigant has made an issue in the case. 113 Litigants should not be compelled to
sacrifice their privacy rights to recover for a physical injury. 14
Ohio may well follow the view that the compulsory waiver will only attach to
the specific area in which injury is alleged. The Ohio Supreme Court, in Baker v.
Industrial Commission,lt5 determined that the assertion of an injury claim only
waives medical information for the specific area of injury. The court stated:
To declare that all diseases of the patient prior to such injury or disease could be shown
would be to contend also that where a client had testified in respect to his attorney in one
107. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 435, 467 P.2d 557, 570, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 842 (1970).
108. Hallendorf v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 553, 559, 149 Cal. Rptr. 564, 568 (1978) (Kane, J., dissenting);
WoMom, supra note 7, § 2380a, at 829.
109. Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 876, 574 P.2d 766, 787, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695, 716 (1978) (Richardson,
J., dissenting).
110. Hallendorf, 85 Cal. App. 3d at 560, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 569 (Kane, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 557, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
112. Britt, 20 Cal. 3d at 863, 574 P.2d at 779, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
113. Brown v. Guiter, 256 Iowa 671, 128 N.W.2d 896 (1964); DeLuca v. Leon, I Pa. D. & C.3d 185 (1977).
114. See In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
115. 135 Ohio St. 491, 21 N.E.2d 593 (1939).
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particular lawsuit, his attorney could thereby under the statute testify not only in respect to
that particular lawsuit but also in respect to any and all other litigation which the attorney
might have conducted for the client. . . .There are different diseases and subjects in the
realm of medicine just as there are different subjects and lawsuits in the realm of law." 6
Therefore, if a litigant commences a personal injury action alleging injuries to
a specific area of his anatomy, it follows that all medical information pertaining to
that specific area should be waived. By claiming injury to the right elbow, one waives
his statutory privilege to all medical information relating to the right elbow while
keeping confidential all medical information pertaining to the left elbow. Requiring
a limited compulsory waiver enables the patient to protect irrelevant medical
information while affording opposing counsel access to communications essential to
his case.
C. What Information May Be Obtained Through a Waiver?
Section 2317.02 attempts to define "communication" broadly when the
physician-patient privilege has been statutorily waived. "'[C]ommunication' means
acquiring, recording, or transmitting any information, in any manner, concerning any
facts, opinions, or statements necessary to enable a physician to diagnose, treat,
prescribe, or act for a patient." 1 7 Before the adoption of this definition by the
legislature, courts were charged with defining what constituted "communica-
tions." 118 While this statutory definition basically codifies prior case law, some
analysis is needed to determine its scope.
The privilege in Ohio attaches to all communications made in the physician-
patient relationship." 9 It applies, however, only to communications made to a
physician who had a relationship to the examination, diagnosis, or treatment of the
patient's condition for which the physician-patient relationship was established. 120
Thus, the privilege attaches to the physician-patient relationship during any consul-
tation with the view to curative treatment. 121 Further, the information obtained by the
treating physician must be essential to enable the physician to perform his duties
properly. The privilege, however, does not protect the knowledge or the existence of
the relationship; it only protects the interchange within the relationship. 122
116. Id. at 494-95, 21 N.E.2d at 595.
117. See supra note 48, at § 2317.02(B)(3).
118. See supra note 39. Since the statute did not explicitly define the meaning of "communication," courts took
up the task of defining the term as it pertained to various circumstances. See, e.g., veis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72
N.E.2d 245 (1947); State v. Dress, 10 Ohio App. 3d 258, 461 N.E.2d 1312 (1982); Vincenzo v. Newhart, 7 Ohio App.
2d 97, 219 N.E.2d 212 (1966), aff'd, 11 Ohio St. 2d 63 (1967); Ramey v. Mets, 3 Ohio App. 2d 329, 210 N.E.2d 449
(1964); Black v. Port, Inc., 120 Ohio App. 369, 202 N.E.2d 638 (1963); In re Roberto, 106 Ohio App. 303, 151 N.E.2d
37 (1958); In re Loewenthal, 101 Ohio App. 355, 134 N.E.2d 158 (1956); York v. Roberts, 9 Ohio Misc. 2d 19, 460
N.E.2d 326 (1983).
119. Rice, Physician.Patient Privilege - A Significant Problem for Counsel?, 20Ointo A. Civ. TRIAL ATr'ys, Spring
1985, at 2.
120. Meier v. Peirano, 76 Ohio App. 9, 62 N.E.2d 920 (1945).
121. WVioatORE, supra note 7, § 2382, at 835.
122. willig v. Prudential Ins. Co., 71 Ohio App. 255, 256, 49 N.E.2d 421, 422 (1942). The court permitted the
two physicians who treated the patient to testify that the relation of physician and patient existed. "Until the relation is
disclosed, there is no privilege to be protected .... The court must find that the confidential relationship existed before
it would be justified in ruling that the physician could not testify . I. " Id. at 257, 49 N.E.2d at 422.
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Communications between the patient and the treating physician can be oral,
written, or the physical exhibition of the body for examination and treatment. 123 As
addressed in section 2317.02(B)(3), any information concerning the patient's
physical condition that is transcribed in "any medical, office, or hospital communi-
cation such as a record, chart, letter, memorandum, laboratory test and results, x-ray,
photograph, financial statement, diagnosis, or prognosis" 2 4 is a privileged commu-
nication.
Since "communications" between a physician and his patient are protected,
many have questioned whether the treating physician may be called as a witness for
the defense. Since neither party may obtain preferential status for any witness, the
treating physician may serve as a witness for the defense, but he is prevented from
testifying as to any privileged "communications."' ' 25 The physician may be asked
hypothetical questions,12 6 but, because of the possibility of intruding into the
patient's protected medical history, the trial court must exercise broad discretion to
ensure that the physician's testimony remains within acceptable parameters.
2 7
When two or more physicians have separate, independent responsibilities, each
physician's communications must be waived individually. ' 28 Thus, a written report
submitted by a specialist will not be deemed a communication to the nonspecialist
treating physician since such a report is made outside the physician-patient
relationship. 129 Communications by other physicians in the possession of the treating
physician, however, may be disclosed only when the consulting physicians are
123. Baker v. Industrial Comm'n, 135 Ohio St. 491, 496, 21 N.E.2d 593, 596 (1939).
124. See supra note 48, at § 2317.02(B)(3).
125. Strizak v. Industrial Comm'n, 159 Ohio St. 475, 479, 112 N.E.2d 537, 539 (1953). The court held that a
treating physician is not precluded from responding to hypothetical questions asked by the defense, provided that the
treating physician disregards any facts or communications he learned while attending the plaintiff. As long as the treating
physician answers the questions hypothetically, no privileged communications would be revealed in his testimony. See
also Vincenzo v. Newhart, 7 Ohio App. 2d 97, 101, 219 N.E.2d 212, 215 (1966). In Vincenzo, the court held that it
would be an abuse of the trial court's discretion to refuse to allow a treating physician subpoenaed by the defense to take
the stand and testify to matters not subject to the physician-patient privilege. See also Moore v. Grandview Hosp., 25 Ohio
St. 3d 194, 495 N.E.2d 934 (1986).
126. Vincenzo, 7 Ohio App. 2d at 102, 219 N.E.2d at 215.
127. The court in Vincenzo stated that:
One can conceive of many competent questions which could be propounded to an attending physician, which
would fall outside the limitation relative to communication and advice covered by the statute. . . . Broad
discretion is vested in the trial court to guard against unfair innuendoes which might arise as a result of trial
strategy.... But to preclude an otherwise competent witness from even taking the stand because of the fear
of such eventuality is clearly an abuse of discretion and gives far more latitude to the statute than was the
legislative intent.
Id. at 102, 219 N.E.2d at 215-16.
128. Moore v. Grandview Hosp., 25 Ohio St. 3d 194, 495 N.E.2d 934 (1986). The court determined that the
plaintiff had two physicians who treated the plaintiff at two separate and distinct times. Distinctions were drawn between
Moore and Conti v. Lynn, Franklin App. No. 75AP-591 (May 20, 1976), in which two physicians jointly treated the
patient. It appears that the Ohio Supreme Court would favor a waiver of the physician-patient privilege for all physicians
who jointly treat a patient when the privilege has been waived for only one physician. However, when one physician
obtains records from another physician who had previously treated the patient (as was the case in Moore), only
communications made while currently treating the patient may be waived.
129. In re Roberto, 106 Ohio App. 303, 310, 151 N.E.2d 37, 41 (1958). Reports obtained from other physicians,
whether oral or written, in the hands of the treating physician are mere hearsay. "[Tiherefore, such evidence in his hands
is incompetent and there is no obligation upon him to disclose the contents thereof." Id.
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engaged in a uniform course of treatment.1 30 Therefore, if two or more physicians
simultaneously treat a patient, the communications conveyed may be disclosed
without separate waivers. One physician may disclose communications made by
other treating physicians if the other physicians' communications were made while
jointly treating the patient.
Likewise, since a treating physician of a prior injury is not engaged in a uniform
course of treatment with a subsequent injury, the mere mention of a previous
operation to the subsequent physician should not waive the privilege with respect to
information concerning the previous operation. 131 Further, to treat a patient ade-
quately, the physician will usually seek and review the patient's physical history.
Although one may assert that "communications" should be given a broad interpre-
tation, encompassing the prior medical history of the plaintiff in the possession of the
current treating physician, the author does not believe that courts should read the
definition this broadly. As noted earlier, prior medical history, although conveyed
within the physician-patient relationship, is not disseminated as an essential element
of the treating process. Prior medical history is helpful to a treating physician, but,
if the physician was not involved in the diagnosis and treatment of the prior injury,
he should not disclose information pertaining to the prior injury unless a waiver is
established for the physician who treated the prior injury. Thus, all medical
information should be revealed by the physician who treated the patient for the
particular injury. Medical information should not be disclosed through a roundabout
manner by physicians who did not "diagnose, treat, prescribe, or act for the
patient." 132
D. Procedures That Must Be Followed to Obtain Unprivileged Information
Although authorizations for release of medical information are routinely
provided upon the request of defense counsel, 133 some courts are not convinced that
this practice is commonplace. 134 Thus, discovery procedures that outline the process
for the retrieval of information from the patient's physician must be established,
defined, and followed. An area of great concern for most jurisdictions is whether a
physician may be informally contacted and interrogated outside the presence of the
patient's counsel.
Many arguments can be enumerated that support ex parte conferences between
opposing counsel and a patient's physician. Courts favoring ex parte conferences
have stressed that (1) public policy considerations favor free access to all relevant
information in a suit; 35 (2) by denying the use of ex parte conferences, defense
130. See Barnard v. Cedar Rapids City Cab Co., 257 Iowa 734, 133 N.W.2d 884 (1965); Brown v. Guiter, 256
Iowa 671, 128 N.W.2d 896 (1964); Moore v. Grandview Hosp., 25 Ohio St. 3d 194, 495 N.E.2d 934 (1986).
131. See Barnard, 257 Iowa 734, 133 N.W.2d 884. By mentioning a previous operation to the treating physician,
the plaintiff did not waive her physician-patient privilege when she called the treating physician to the stand to testify. Id.
at 751, 133 N.W.2d at 895.
132. See supra note 48, at § 2317.02(B)(3).
133. Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257, 1260 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985).
134. Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Iowa 1986).
135. Green. 501 A.2d at 1258.
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counsel must resort to the use of depositions, which increases the cost of the litigation
and creates logistical problems; 136 (3) the physician-patient privilege should not be
used to suppress the truth concerning the patient's injuries; 37 (4) ex parte confer-
ences help to eliminate the need and expense of calling the treating physician as a
witness in a trial or for a deposition when the physician's testimony will not benefit
the defense;1 38 (5) if the patient's attorney is required to be present at all times when
the patient is being questioned, the patient's attorney will be able to monitor his
adversary's progress, while no scrutiny is placed on the patient's counsel; 139 (6) no
proprietary right exists for any person's testimony; 140 (7) informal interviews permit
early evaluation and settlement of cases; 14' (8) courts may issue protective orders
limiting the scope of production and dissemination of information in ex parte
conferences; 42 (9) ex parte conferences are not barred by the rules of civil
procedure; 143 (10) the treating physician's information should be equally accessible to
both sides; 144 and (11) denying ex parte conferences impedes the broad goals of
discovery. 145 While these considerations are important factors, the Ohio General
Assembly has apparently prohibited ex parte examinations by limiting the discovery
mechanisms available to opposing counsel to those defined under the rules of civil
procedure. 146
Although it may be difficult to determine the General Assembly's motive in
restricting the retrieval of information to those procedures defined in the rules of civil
procedure, many persuasive factors support such a determination. To begin with,
most patients recognize that a confidential and fiduciary relationship exists between
themselves and their physician. 147 Ever since the fifth century B.C., the Hippocratic
Oath 48 has governed the ethics of the medical profession, rooting the confidentiality
136. Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983); State ex rel. Stufflebam v. Appelquist, 694
S.W.2d 882, 888 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
137. State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 59 (Mo. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983).
138. Doe, 99 F.R.D. at 128; Stempler v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 495 A.2d 857 (1985); Lazorick v. Brown, 195
N.J. Super. 444, 455, 480 A.2d 223, 229 (1984).
139. Doe, 99 F.R.D. at 128.
140. Id.
141. Trans-World Inv. v. Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Alaska 1976).
142. State ex rel. McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Mo. 1968).
143. Doe, 99 F.R.D. at 128; Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257, 1258 (Del. 1985); Stempler v. Speidell, 100
N.J. 368, 382, 495 A.2d 857, 864-65 (1985); Lazorick v. Brown, 195 N.J. Super. 444, 454-55, 480 A.2d 223, 228
(1984).
144. Doe, 99 F.R.D. at 128; Green, 501 A.2d at 1259; Lazorick, 195 N.J. Super. at 456, 480 A.2d at 230.
145. Green, 501 A.2d at 1258; Stempler, 100 N.J. at 381-82, 495 A.2d at 863; Lazorick, 195 N.J. Super. at 455,
480 A.2d at 229.
146. See supra note 48, at § 2317.02(B)(2).
147. Alston v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp., 107 F.R.D. 35, 37 (D.D.C. 1985).
148. The Hippocratic Oath states: "What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of the
treatment in regard to the life of man, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will keep to myself holding such
things shameful to be spoken about." EDELSEIN, THE HippocRIC OATH, TEXT, TRANSLATION AND INTERPRE-rAToN 3
(1945).
Hippocrates (circa 400 B.C.) is known as the "Father of Medicine." He was perhaps the first to express a physician's
ethical duty to his patient. Due to the primitive methods of recordation during Hippocrates' era, one may find slight
variations in the Hippocratic Oath. See, e.g., DeWitt, Privileged Communications between Physician and Patient, 10 W.
REs. L. REv. 488 (1959).
Due to the existence of the Hippocratic Oath, one can safely state that physicians for several hundred years have
acknowledged their obligation of keeping in trust a patient's confidences.
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of the physician-patient privilege deep in history and tradition. As the court in
Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 149 indicated, "[a]lmost every member of
the public is aware of the promise of discretion contained in the Hippocratic Oath,
and every patient has a right to rely upon this warranty of silence."t 5 0
The American Medical Association's (AMA) Principles of Medical Ethics
further obligates the physician to act honestly and confidentially. 15 1 Principle II
indicates that "a physician shall deal honestly with his patients and colleagues .... ,"
and Principle IV states that "[a] physician shall respect the rights of patients, of
colleagues, and of other health professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences
within the constraints of law." 5 2
The final source defining the ethics of the medical profession may be found in
the Current Opinions of the Judicial Council of the American Medical Association. 153
Canon 5.05 of the Current Opinions states that "It]he information disclosed to a
physician during the course of the relationship between physician and patient is
confidential to the greatest possible degree. . . .The physician should not reveal
confidential communications or information without the express consent of the
patient, unless required to do so by law."' 54
Due to the medical profession's oath of secrecy, 55 the pledge to safeguard
patient's confidences, 156 and the concern to keep physician-patient communications
confidential to the greatest degree possible, 57 a patient has a right to rely on the
physician's faithful execution of these ethical obligations.158
Further, a fiduciary relationship based upon trust and confidence exists between
a patient and his treating physician.' 59 Hammonds underscored the fiduciary
149. 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
150. Id. at 801.
151. PRINCILES OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMEpIcAN MEDICA. ASSOCLATON (1937). The principles of medical ethics
generally express the duty of a physician to his patients, the profession, and the public. "[I]t is incumbent on the physician
that under all conditions, his bearing toward patients, the public and fellow practitioners should be characterized by a
gentlemanly deportment and that he constantly should behave toward others as he desires them to deal with him." Id. at
24.
152. Id. at 4.
153. CuRRer OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNSEL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL AssOCIATION (1984).
154. The full text of Canon 5.05 states:
The information disclosed to a physician during the course of the relationship between physician and patient is
confidential to the greatest possible degree. The patient should feel free to make a full disclosure of information
to the physician in order that the physician may most effectively provide needed services. The patient should
be able to make this disclosure with the knowledge that the physician will respect the confidential nature of the
communication. The physician should not reveal confidential communications or information without the
express consent of the patient, unless required to do so by law.
The obligation to safeguard patient confidences is subject to certain exceptions which are ethically and
legally justified because of overriding social considerations. Where a patient threatens to inflict serious bodily
harm to another person and there is a reasonable probability that the patient may carry out the threat, the
physician should take reasonable precautions for the protection of the intended victim, including notification of
law enforcement authorities. Also, communicable diseases, gun shot and knife wounds, should be reported as
required by applicable statutes or ordinances.
Id. at 19.
155. See supra note 148.
156. See supra note 151.
157. See supra note 153.
158. Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 11. App. 3d 581, 592, 499 N.E.2d 952, 959 (1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 3232 (1987).
159. Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984).
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relationship between physician and patient: "[T]he patient necessarily reposes a great
deal of trust not only in the skill of the physician but in his discretion as well. The
introduction in this relationship of the aura of trust, and the expectation of
confidentiality that results therefrom, imposes the fiduciary obligations upon the
doctor." 160 In Ohio, breach of the physician's fiduciary obligation of secrecy and
undivided loyalty entitles the patient to legal recourse, 161 either for the breach of a
patient's right to privacy or for professional discipline due to the physician's
unprofessional conduct.162 By prohibiting ex parte conferences, the occasion for a
treating physician to breach his fiduciary obligation will be minimized.
Physicians are not trained in the intricate operations of the law and a tremendous
burden would be placed upon the shoulders of medical professionals if informal
conferences were permissible. An improper determination by a treating physician
would expose the physician to liability even though the physician did not intend to
reveal confidential communications.' 63 Physicians may also be led to reveal
confidential information due to high pressure tactics by over-zealous advocates. It is
not beyond the realm of imagination that opposing counsel may improperly pressure
a physician to release information to satisfy a client's interests.' 64 Likewise,
determining what is and what is not confidential information is not always clear. A
physician should not be placed in the position of deciding what information can be
released since he, experiencing the same problems courts face, may not be able to
determine the extent to which a patient's privilege may be waived. 165
Informal contacts may also lead the physician into a situation where he becomes
a witness against a patient, 166 a result contrary to the theory of undivided loyalty
owed by the physician to the patient. 167 The physician may even become a potential
third party defendant if his treatment exacerbated the patient's injuries, and the
opposing counsel, seeking information benefiting the defense, may become a witness
to the damaging admissions of the treating physician. ' 68 Thus, if exparte conferences
160. Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 802 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
161. Id. at 799.
162. Note, Legal Protection of the Confidential Nature of the Physician-Patient Relationship, 52 COLuM. L. REv.
383, 397-98 (1952). A tort action against the treating physician who discloses confidential communications can be
brought against the physician due to his breach of confidence. See also Note, Medical Practice and the Right to Privacy,
43 MiNN. L. REv. 943 (1959).
163. Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa 1986).
164. Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc. 2d 148, 153,413 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585, aff'd, 73 App. Div. 2d 589,422 N.Y.S.2d
887 (1979). See also Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965). In Hammonds,
a treating physician was induced to disclose medical information concerning one of his patients because the insurer falsely
stated that a malpractice action was being brought against him.
165. A cursory reading of the complaint by a layman will usually not clearly indicate whether the patient's physical
condition is an issue in the case. Judicial scrutiny is required. Thus, without legal advice, a physician will usually not be
able to determine when he can and cannot disclose medical communications.
166. Alston v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp., 107 F.R.D. 35, 38 (D.D.C. 1985). For example, if a patient
brings a cause of action against another party claiming that the patient's condition was worsened by the other party's
conduct, if the physician is called to the stand, the physician could be in a position which would require him to testify
against his patient. "Such a situation not only results in a clear conflict of interest, but could compromise the course of
treatment being provided to the plaintiff as a patient." Id.
167. Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 799 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
168. Alston, 107 F.R.D. at 38. If the physician makes damaging admissions concerning the manner in which he
treated the patient, then the defense attorney could be placed in the role of a witness for the plaintiff if a malpractice suit
is initiated.
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were permitted, the physician would not only be doing a disservice to the patient, but
possibly to himself as well. By using formal discovery devices, the presence of the
patient's counsel when a treating physician is deposed ensures that the physician does
not disclose personal confidences of the patient. The patient's counsel "helps to
protect the doctor from unwittingly and improperly disclosing medical information
about his patient."'169
The arguments that the taking of a deposition is costly, is inefficient, and leads
to scheduling problems are not sufficient to justify exparte conferences. '7 0 The rules
of civil procedure prescribe various methods of retrieving information from parties
and witnesses that seek to decrease the cost of litigation. As long as prudence is
exercised by counsel requesting medical information, alternative discovery devices
may be utilized to retrieve the requested material. Opposing counsel can issue written
interrogatories,' 7 1 or a deposition upon written questions may be filed. 172 Further, if
the patient submits to an adverse medical examination and the patient requests a copy
of the examination, opposing counsel is entitled to receive a copy of the medical
report from the patient's examining physician. 173 Given the procedures that exist to
help decrease the cost of litigation, the hardships faced by opposing counsel are not
substantial enough to carve an exception into the well-established rules of
discovery. 174
Strict adherence to formal discovery procedures does not suppress the truth
surrounding the patient's injuries. Ohio's rule limiting discovery to those processes
defined in the rules of civil procedure "merely regulates the discovery process so as
to protect the confidential relationship existing between a patient and his treating
physician.''175 No "truth" is kept out of court since the same information procured
169. \Venninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 411, 240 N.W.2d 333, 336 (1976).
170. Both federal and Ohio civil rule 30 permit either party to depose anyone, party or nonparty, who might have
information within the scope of discovery as set out in rule 26. Rule 30 calls for an oral deposition, and, if the deponent
is a nonparty, a subpoena must be used in order to compel the deponent's presence. It is undisputed that there may be
scheduling problems, but it is the obligation of both parties to solve these conflicts and to make the litigation run as
smoothly as possible. Further, the rules of civil procedure have made the litigation process more efficient by reducing the
amount of time required before the judge and jury, thus striving to make each case less costly to taxpayers. As those who
oppose the use of the rules of civil procedure contend, a higher cost may be passed on to the litigants, but this appears
to be justified since they are the ones principally involved in the suit.
171. Federal and Ohio civil rule 33 allow the parties in an action to submit written interrogatories to each other. The
responding party and his attorney then sit down and prepare written responses to the interrogatories. Since the responding
party and his attorney can sit down at their own convenience, scheduling problems are diminished. Further, a lower cost
is attributable to written interrogatories since they are prepared and answered in the attorney's office using his resources.
172. Federal and Ohio civil rule 31 allow either party to depose anyone using written questions. The deponent
attends the deposition and is read the written questions by a person designated to preside at the deposition. The deponent's
responses are recorded and made available to both parties. Rule 31 written depositions are typically cheaper than rule 30
oral depositions since under written questions, counsel does not have to be present when the questions are being answered.
However, the party formulating the questions does have to work under the handicap of not knowing what the answers will
be to initial questions and must draft subsequent questions that will elicit the desired information necessary for the party's
case.
173. Federal and Ohio civil rule 35 allow the defendant to request the plaintiff to submit to a medical examination
to determine the extent of the injuries. This will give the defendant an opportunity to evaluate the claim for any
exaggeration or fraud. While a plaintiff may agree to be examined without resorting to rule 35, certain provisions of rule
35 nonetheless apply. Both parties may receive a copy of the evaluation.
174. Garner v. Ford Motor Co., 61 F.R.D. 22 (D. Alaska 1983); Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 111.
App. 3d 581, 598, 499 N.E.2d 952, 963 (1986), cert. denied sub nom. Tobin v. Petrillo, 107 S. Ct. 3232 (1987).
175. Petrillo, 148 111. App. 3d at 603, 499 N.E.2d at 969.
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through ex parte conferences may be acquired by following formal discovery
procedures.
If opposing counsel decides to depose the treating physician, the patient's
counsel has a right to be present. His presence, however, is not mandated to monitor
or invade the work product of opposing counsel. Rather, his presence assures the
patient that the trust between the physician and patient is not breached. 176 Patient's
counsel is present to protect confidential information and to ensure that the
physician's responses concern relevant issues.177
The rules of civil procedure will also prevent opposing counsel from inquiring
into facts that are irrelevant to the lawsuit or that do not lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.178 A patient's counsel should ensure that opposing counsel does
not stray down forbidden paths.
In addition, private conversations with a patient's physician are not contem-
plated by the rules of civil procedure and are thus improper. 179 The fact that the rules
do not explicitly bar ex parte conferences does not justify their use. The rules
enumerate permissible procedures. These procedures are the exclusive means by
which information pertaining to a patient's physical condition may be obtained. 180
Rules cannot be expanded to satisfy personal desires; strict adherence to these rules
affords continuity and certainty in the judicial process.
The General Assembly's determination to limit discovery to those procedures
enumerated in the rules of civil procedure does not give the patient a proprietary right
to the testimony of his physician. By using the rules to their full potential,' 8' both
sides experience equal access to the treating physician. The physician is free to form
and express his opinion concerning the cause, nature, or extent of the patient's
injuries. This freedom of disclosure cannot be suppressed merely because the
physician renders medical treatment and advice to the patient. 182
176. Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 411, 240 N.W.2d 333, 336 (1976).
177. Alston v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp., 107 F.R.D. 35, 37 (D.D.C. 1985); Roosevelt Hotel Ltd.
Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa 1986). Using federal civil rule 30(c) and Ohio civil rule 30(C), the
patient's counsel can submit an objection during a deposition to preserve the objection for the court.
178. Alston, 107 F.R.D. at 37; Wenninger, 307 Minn. at 410, 240 N.W.2d at 336.
179. Garner v. Ford Motor Co., 61 F.R.D. 22 (Alaska 1973); Weaver v. Mann, 90 F.R.D. 443, 445 (N.D. 1981);
Wenninger, 307 Minn. at 405, 240 N.W.2d at 333.
180. Wenninger, 307 Minn. at 410, 240 N.W.2d at 336.
18 1. Either party may depose the physician orally, see supra note 170, or through written questions, see supra note
172. Further, opposing counsel can obtain all of the plaintiff's relevant medical records from the treating physician
pursuant to both federal and Ohio civil rule 16. Rule 16 allows the court, in its discretion, to conduct pretrial conferences
to obtain information that will enable the efficient disposition of the action.
[Tihe Court ordered exchange of medical reports and information, pursuant to a theory that a pretrial disclosure
of privileged information, without the necessity of waiver, is a valid means to enable counsel to prepare for trial
and disposition upon the merits of any litigation, and is, therefore, an order that would be sanctioned by [federal
and Ohio civil rule 16].
Rice, supra note 88, at 2 (emphasis in original).
182. Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 111. App. 3d 581, 597-98, 499 N.E.2d 952, 963 (1986), cert. denied
sub nom. Tobin v. Petrillo, 107 S. Ct. 3232 (1987). The court stated:
Moreover, we do not believe that a treating physician is "neutralized" merely because he provides medical
assistance to a patient-plaintiff. If, in treating a patient, a physician forms an opinion as to the cause, nature,
or extent of a patient's injury, that physician is in no way.., prohibited from voicing that opinion in a court
of law.. .. [B]y barring ex pane conferences, we do not "neutralize" the opinion of a treating physician;
instead, we merely insure that the opinion of that treating physician is disclosed in a manner that not only
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The trust placed in a physician can never be restored through protective orders
granted by the court. "[An 'after the fact' ruling by a trial court will [not]
sufficiently remedy the potential breaches of trust that will occur should defense
counsel be given an unfettered right to engage in exparte conferences with a patient's
treating physician." 18
Limiting the retrieval of information to those procedures outlined in the rules of
civil procedure furthers the goals of discovery. By adopting the current version of the
physician-patient privilege, the Ohio General Assembly has "facilitate[d] the
efficient presentation and resolution of controversies."1 8 4 As long as attorneys follow
the rules of civil procedure, neither the patient nor the physician will be placed in a
situation where any fiduciary obligation may be breached.
E. Where Has the Waiver for Voluntary Testimony Gone?
Before the adoption of the Tort Reform Act of 1987, section 2317.02 permitted
a waiver of the physician-patient privilege when a patient voluntarily testified
concerning his mental or physical condition. 85 This exception, however, no longer
expressly exists.' 86 The rationale behind the inclusion of this exception was that the
purpose of the privilege was no longer served when a patient disclosed information
concerning his condition or treatment. 8 7
Under the immediate predecessor to section 2317.02,188 courts determined that
a patient voluntarily testified when he released information under direct
examination' 89 or in a patient-initiated deposition called to perpetuate the patient's
testimony. 190 If the patient voluntarily took the stand and disclosed the information,
discovers the truth, but also protects the confidential and fiduciary relationship existing between a patient and
his physician.
Id.
183. Id. at 601, 499 N.E.2d at 966. The trial court can issue in limine motions and protective orders and thus attempt
to protect the patient's privileged communications with his physician. It is difficult, however, to perceive how an in limine
motion or a protective order ". . . can realistically restore a patient's trust and confidence in his treating physician after
it has been disclosed that the physician whom the plaintiff approached for help has been, without the patient's consent or
knowledge, engaging in private conferences with that patient's legal adversary." Id.
184. R. FrELD, B. KAPLAN, AND K. CL..tiorr, MATERIALS FOR A BAsic COURSE IN Civu. PROCEDURE 57-77 (5th ed.
1984).
185. See supra note 39.
186. See supra note 48.
187. WVitio'E, supra note 7, § 2388, at 856. Professor Wigmore stated that:
[tihe party's own voluntary testimony, on trial, to his physical condition in issue, should be a waiver of the
privilege for the testimony of a physician who has been consulted about the same physicial condition in
issue .... Certainly it is a spectacle fit to increase the layman's traditional contempt for the chicanery of the
law when a plaintiff describes at length to the jury and a crowded courtroom the details of his supposed ailment
and then is permitted to suppress the available proof of his falsities by asserting that he wishes to keep the matter
confidential.
Id. at 856-59 (emphasis in original).
188. See supra note 39.
189. Harpman v. Devine, 133 Ohio St. 1, 5-9, 10 N.E.2d 776, 780 (1937); Cuthbertson v. Cincinnati Union
Terminal, 103 Ohio App. 385, 388, 145 N.E.2d 467, 470 (1957); York v. Roberts, 9 Ohio Misc. 2d 19, 460 N.E.2d 326
(1983).
190. Covington v. Sawyer, 9 Ohio App. 3d 40, 48-49,458 N.E.2d 465,471 (1983); In re Roberto, 106 Ohio App.
303, 306, 151 N.E.2d 37, 41 (1958); In re Loewenthal, 101 Ohio App. 355, 134 N.E.2d 158 (1956); Pacheco v. Oritz,
II Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 463 N.E.2d 670 (1983).
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the patient was deemed to have waived the privilege. 191 However, when the patient
is placed in a defensive posture, any privileged information disclosed will not waive
the privilege since the patient did not voluntarily disclose the communications. Thus,
following established precedent, if the privileged information is disclosed during the
patient's deposition through cross-examination by adverse counsel, the physician-
patient privilege is not waived and the physician cannot disclose the privileged
information.
There was some debate in the Ohio courts about the extent to which the patient
needed to testify before the privilege was voluntarily waived. Did generally alluding
to the patient's physical condition waive the privilege, or must the reference be more
specific? In Harpman v. Devine,192 the court determined that commenting generally
on the patient's physical condition was not detailed enough to voluntarily waive the
privilege. The patient needed to testify fully about his physical condition to waive the
privilege. 193 By mentioning the physician's name and by testifying fully as to the
injuries, symptoms, and complaints, the patient waived the privilege. The physician,
however, could testify only to those matters upon which the patient had voluntarily
testified. 194
In Harpman, the court stated that if the General Assembly had intended to
include statements made during both direct and cross-examination as effectuating a
waiver, it would have left the word "voluntarily" out of the statute. 195 The current
version of section 2317.02, however, not only deletes the word "voluntarily," but it
eliminates this exception to the privilege when the patient testifies as to his physical
condition. 196 Does this mean that voluntarily testifying no longer waives the
physician-patient privilege? Further, if the statute contains a compulsory waiver for
commencing an action, is it necessary to have a waiver when the patient testifies?
As noted previously, the physician-patient privilege is in derogation of the
common law and therefore must be strictly construed. 197 The privilege, according to
the Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel. Lambdin v. Brenton, applies to those
relationships expressly stated in the statute. 198 Thus, if the waiver is not expressly set
forth in the statute, the privilege is not waived.
Clearly there is no need to establish a waiver for a patient who commences an
action by filing a suit. In such an instance, the current physician-patient privilege sets
forth a compulsory waiver. Thus, if the patient is also the litigant who files an action,
the privilege is waived regardless of whether the litigant voluntarily testifies
regarding his physical condition. A witness, however, cannot "file" a cause of
191. Ausdenmoore v. Holzback, 89 Ohio St. 381, 383, 106 N.E. 41 (1914). Voluntarily testifying about one's
physical condition is deemed to be an express waiver.
192. 133 Ohio St. 1, 10 N.E.2d 776 (1937).
193. See also Baker v. Industrial Comm'n, 135 Ohio St. 491, 493-95, 21 N.E.2d 593, 596 (1939); Roberto, 106
Ohio App. at 309-1d, 151 N.E.2d at 40; Cuthbertson, 103 Ohio App. at 390, 145 N.E.2d at 471.
194. Baker, 135 Ohio St. at 498, 21 N.E.2d at 596-97.
195. Harpman v. Devine, 133 Ohio St. 1, 9, 10 N.E.2d 776, 780 (1937).
196. See supra note 48.
197. Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947).
198. State ex rel. Lambdin v. Brenton, 21 Ohio St. 2d 21, 24, 254 N.E.2d 681, 683 (1970). See also Weis, 147 Ohio
St. at 428-29, 72 N.E.2d at 252.
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action, and thus does not fall under the enumerated waivers in section 2317.02. Due
to the absence of an exception when the patient testifies concerning his physical
condition, it is presumed that a witness can never waive his physician-patient
privilege.
For example, assume that X is a witness in Y's personal injury action against a
restaurant. X and Y had dinner together at the restaurant, and they ate the house salad
dressing that allegedly gave both of them food poisoning. X and Y sue separately. Y
calls X as a witness, and X takes the stand during direct examination and states that
he had the house salad dressing, contracted food poisoning, and was treated by Dr.
Z. Due to the change in section 2317.02, it is presumed that X has not waived his
physician-patient privilege even though he disclosed privileged information openly in
court. By openly testifying that he contracted food poisoning and by disclosing
significant parts of his communications with his physician, X should be held to
have waived his physician-patient privilege since the purpose underlying the privilege
no longer exists when the patient openly discloses his medical ailments. 199
Under this scenario, counsel for the restaurant would be denied information
concerning the validity of X's claim, and thus would be unable to fully cross-examine
X. Y, on the other hand, would benefit from X's assertion of the physician-patient
privilege since X's untested statements would help Y's case. X should not be entitled
to withhold information that may be extremely relevant in Y's suit simply because he
is a witness. By disclosing significant parts of his communications with his physician,
X should be compelled to disclose the truth of his physical condition that he has freely
placed before the court.
If the testimonial waiver is re-established within the physician-patient privilege,
the word "voluntarily" will need to be omitted. Following court precedent, a witness
may never be in a position to "voluntarily" testify. The witness would never be in
charge of direct examination or of the deposition to perpetuate his testimony. 200 For
example, California Evidence Code section 912 states that the right of a patient to
claim the privilege "is waived with respect to a communication protected by such
privilege if any holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant
part of the communication.''201 The court in Jones v. Superior Court202 held that
even though a witness could not waive the privilege through the physician-litigant
exception, the witness could waive the privilege by freely disclosing the communi-
cations in court. Ohio should adopt a provision similar to the California statute. The
rationale of the privilege is not furthered when a witness' medical information is
withheld even though the witness freely testifies concerning his injuries, symptoms,
and complaints.
199. Jones v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1981). In Jones, the court recognized that
a witness could not place her physicial condition at issue in the proceeding pursuant to § 996(a) of the California Evidence
Code. However, since the witness in Jones voluntarily testified about her condition, pursuant to § 912 of the California
Evidence Code, she waived her physician-patient privilege. This is logical since it would be a twist upon logic to hold
that the privilege still exists even though the physical condition of the witness has already been publicly communicated.
200. See supra notes 190-91.
201. CAL. EvID. CODE § 912 (\Vest 1966 & Supp. 1988).
202. 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1981). For further elaboration, see supra notes 106 and 199.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The General Assembly, in its current version of section 2317.02, has made
considerable progress toward making the physician-patient privilege a fairer and more
beneficial legal tool. Allowing the privilege to be waived when a personal injury
action is filed no longer allows the patient to hide behind the privilege to the detriment
of defense counsel. Indeed, when the patient files a personal injury action, the
justification behind the privilege no longer exists. This change allows counsel more
time to concentrate on the merits of the case rather than the procedural confrontations
of retrieving medical information.
Limiting the retrieval of medical information to those mechanisms outlined in
the rules of civil procedure should reduce the judicial quagmire experienced by other
states. The rules of civil procedure facilitate the efficient operation of the judicial
system. As such, the Ohio General Assembly was judicious when it decided to
explicitly confine the retrieval of information to the rules of civil procedure.
Further legislative refinement of the privilege, however, should occur. Elimi-
nating the waiver when a person testifies about his physical ailments allows a witness
to disclose his entire medical history without waiving the privilege. If a witness is not
deemed to have waived his physician-patient privilege upon freely and openly
disclosing medical communications, a court may not have all of the relevant
information before it.203 As the physician-patient privilege currently stands, a witness
may allege a physical injury or aliment, yet opposing counsel may not be able to
obtain the witness' medical records to verify the witness' assertions. This hinders the
pursuit of justice. Therefore, the Ohio General Assembly should correct this
oversight before a litigant is harmed by its absence.
Robert A. Wade*
203. See supra note 106.
* The author wishes to acknowledge and thank David H. Meade of the firm Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Becker in
Columbus, Ohio for his thoughtful insight during the preparation of this Note.
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